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Abstract 
The point of departure for this article is the question of how to pursue and encourage political 
contestation from a position that acknowledges the significance of binary conceptualisations, 
but that is at the same time uncomfortable with a mode of politics that is exclusively geared 
towards them. The limitations of this traditionally modern conceptualisation of politics – and 
life more generally – calls for an ontological move away from the prioritisation of bounded 
entities and clear-cut (oppositional) identities in order to explore other dimensions of political 
action. While there has been a turn to such new ontologies – in critical geography and beyond 
– in the last decades, there has been less exploration of what this could mean concretely for a 
political activism that aims to go beyond mere ‘micropolitical’ transformation. To address this 
lack, this article examines the tensions between binarity and complexity through an 
engagement with political resistance against genetically modified organisms (GMOs). This 
brings to light that the ontology of complexity pursued by some anti-GMO activists is 
ultimately grounded in a binarisation of both politics (one is either ‘for’ or ‘against’ GMOs’) 
and life (which is either ‘natural’ or ‘unnatural’). Whilst problematic in its limitation and 
specification of what kind of politics and life is considered ‘right’ and ‘natural’, this 
binarisation also informs the success of anti-GMO activism. An engagement with the 
philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari, especially through the notion of the ‘encounter’, brings 
out this paradox and serves to radicalise the ontology of complexity argued for by anti-GMO 
activists in order to open up different avenues for thinking about and ‘doing’ political 
resistance.  
Introduction 
This article explores the question of how to pursue and encourage political contestation from 
a position that acknowledges the significance of binary conceptualisations, but that is at the 
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same time uncomfortable with a mode of politics that is exclusively geared towards them. 
While binary understandings might be indispensable for the success of political action, it is 
important to understand what ways of thinking and acting they render invisible; what they 
(necessarily) exclude. As Brian Massumi (Massumi and Zournazi, 2003: 220) points out, if 
you want “to critique something in any kind of definitive way”, you need to “pin it down”. 
You need to separate it out, “attribute[…] set characteristics to it” in order to enable “final 
judgment”. What is lost are “other more moving dimensions of experience”.  
As we will maintain, acknowledging these other, non-binary dimensions of political 
action requires a different ontology of life; one that moves beyond traditionally modern 
understandings that prioritise bounded entities and their clear-cut binary identities. We aim to 
draw out such a different ontology by exploring a particular example of political activism: the 
anti-genetically modified organisms (GMO) movement. As the next two sections will show, 
at least in its earliest manifestation, in parts of the movement the opposition to GMOs was 
grounded in a different ontology derived from complexity science, according to which all life 
develops in complex, non-binary and unpredictable ways. However, as we will demonstrate, 
this (scientific) understanding of complexity is limited insofar as only a certain direction of 
evolving life is acknowledged and tolerated, thereby generating new sets of binaries, such as 
the ‘natural’ versus the ‘unnatural’, or the ‘harmonious’ versus the ‘disturbing’. In addition, 
we will examine the dangerous implications this has for the – once again binary – organistion 
of political resistance, whilst acknowledging that the binaries that have emerged also ground 
the political force, and ultimately the success, of anti-GMO activism.  
We engage the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze (and Félix Guattari) to make sense of this 
paradox, as well as to radicalise the different ontology of life emphasised by anti-GMO 
activists, and to thereby open up new avenues for thinking about and ‘doing’ political 
resistance more generally. In the last decades there has been a strong turn to Deleuze and 
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Guattari in critical approaches to geography and beyond (cf. Tolia-Kelly, 2006). However, 
there has been less exploration of what this turn could mean concretely for a political activism 
that aims to go beyond what could be called micropolitical transformation (e.g. via affectively 
engaging the arts) or an ethics of the self (see e.g. Widder, 2012: 135; Lapworth, 2015; 
Massumi, 1996; Popke, 2009).1 It could be argued that engaging more ‘traditional’ political 
action brings up the problem of binaries more forcefully, as such activism often relies on a 
strong ‘us’/’them’ understanding (encapsulated in the very term ‘re-sistance’) (cf. Widder, 
2012: 129-35).  
In order to problematise, but not outright dismiss binary conceptualisations of life and 
politics, this article makes use of Deleuze’s concept of the ‘encounter’, which so far is seldom 
engaged in ‘Deleuzean’ approaches to politics. Indeed, the ‘encounter’ is often not regarded 
as a concept in itself, but, via Deleuze’s writing on Spinoza, is simply employed as the ground 
for affective relationships. This is precisely what leads to a focus on questions of ethics, of 
“how to live”, posed by the transversal connectivity of the body that means one cannot know 
in advance what a body is capable of (Deleuze, 1988: 125). It is an ethics of increasing the 
body’s joyful encounters (O’Sullivan, 2006: 41; Ash, 2010: 657) in the effort to constitute a 
“new political subject” (Ruddick, 2010:22; cf. Lapworth 2015: 93) or develop an ethos of 
“corporeal response-ability” (Popke, 2009: 83). At first glance, the concept of the encounter 
seems to contribute to this understanding: according to Deleuze (2004: 176), ‘encountering’ 
life involves a move away from aiming to recognise external objects as different from us as 
subjects (for example, as ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’), and towards the possibility of 
unrecognisable and unrepresentable sensation that is direct and not removable from 
experience (cf. Massumi and Zourmazi, 2003). In Maria Hynes’s words (2013: 1936-37; cf. 
O’Sullivan, 2006: 1), the encounter operates at the level that is set “before the organisation 
                                                 
1 It goes without saying that this work is very significant and has been rightly challenging more ‘traditional’ understandings 
of political action. 
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required by human perception.”2 A move away from that which is captured by prevailing 
knowledge practices, the encounter refers to the coming into being of new modes of 
subjectivity and thus allows responses to situations that are “as-yet unthought” (Hynes, 2013: 
1939-40).  
However, one important implication of invoking the encounter as concept is that it is 
able to shed light on the violent and shocking character of what happens when ‘sense’ hits 
taken-for-granted categories; on how new political imaginaries are in need of a “dark 
precursor” (Ruddick, 2010: 24, 36; cf. Lapworth, 2015: 91). The concept of the encounter 
enables us to not just focus on the ‘as-yet unthought’ that can come into being; it also puts 
into question ‘the already-thought’, and the violence that brought it about. It thereby helps us 
to deal with the often-expressed critique that non-representational, “affectual” theory occludes 
how ‘affect’ and the construction of new thought is impacted on by particular (historical) 
“power geometries”; by inequalities and oppression (Tolia-Kelly, 2006: 213-4). Encounters 
are differentiated and particular; their ‘sensation’ is inextricably related to particular, 
dominating configurations of thought and practice.  
Related to this, the concept of the encounter makes clear that what has been 
‘disturbed’ will be (re-)grounded within (new) frames of recognition. This has significant 
consequences for the ontological reconceptualisation of politics-life (Ansems de Vries, 2014) 
pursued in this article. It enables us to conceive of politics-life  as comprised of (at least) two 
simultaneous movements that are often difficult to tell apart: one of ungrounding and one of 
grounding (in which the latter constitutes a force of binary ordering or territorialisation).3 
Whether or not, or to what extent the movement of ungrounding is primary is, we argue, a 
                                                 
2 Hynes makes this point in relation to art understood as a particular mode of thinking, drawing primarily on the 
thought of Guattari. For Hynes (2013: 1937), Deleuze and Guattari offer ‘an appreciation of art’s relationship to 
life, beyond the mere representation of life-as-object or the expression of life-as-subjective experience.’ 
3 The intricate relationality of these forces is repeatedly highlighted by Deleuze and Guattari themselves (e.g. 
Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 62-63; 327-329; 397-398) and employed in different ways by various Deleuze 
scholars (e.g. Ansell Pearson, 1999: 153-54; Bennett, 2010: 21-24; Connolly, 2011: 44; Protevi, 2013: 48). 
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matter of ambiguity in Deleuze and Guattari’s writing itself.4 Put succinctly, if the force of 
ungrounding could be considered ontologically primary, it is only on the basis of, and in 
relation to, the simultaneous existence of the latter, grounding force. Consequently, life – and 
politics – is not simply complex, fleeting and affectual instead of binary, rigid, and organised 
in line with particular ‘power geometries’. Such a reading simply produces a new binary. 
Similar to the way in which anti-GMO activists confront the ‘unnatural’ with the ‘natural’, too 
many of those who engage Deleuze’s thought confront ‘becoming’ (or ‘affect’) with ‘being’ 
(or ‘organisation’) as its binary ‘other’.5  
As we will show in this article, a radical politics in relation to anti-GMO activism 
involves an opening up to encounters that disrupt taken-for-granted categories such as ‘pro’ or 
‘anti’, ‘natural’ or ‘unnatural’. In the last section, where we engage Gregg Hetherington’s 
‘encounter’ (2013) with peasant anti-(GMO) soy bean activism in Paraguay (and his 
consequent activism), we unravel how this kind of thinking is intrinsically linked to (violent) 
histories of colonialism and modernisation. However, the article also argues that the re-
ordering, or grounding, of this move of questioning might mean that (new) binaries emerge 
that once again settle thought and are in danger of exclusion and violence. As we will 
maintain in the conclusion, fear of such re-ordering should not lead to political paralysis.  
                                                 
4 Deleuze and Guattari develop the relations between the complex and the binary, deterritorialisation and 
reterritorialisation, the molar and the molecular, the rhizomatic and the arborescent in different – and not 
necessarily compatible (cf. Woods, et al, 2013) – ways in different texts as well as within the same text. This 
slipping or becoming of concepts is characteristic of their ontology. Hence, we do not seek to give a ‘true’ or 
‘correct’ account of these concepts (cf. O’Sullivan, 2006: 5), rather, like Deleuze and Guattari (2004: 4) we are 
interested in their functionality in connection with other things. One could say that we do philosophy Deleuzean 
and Guattarian style. In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari (1994: 2-4) define philosophy as the creation 
of concepts; the philosopher is the concept’s friend. Yet, to befriend a concept is not simply to accept its 
character but to engage, produce and perturb it affectively – as both friend and rival.  
5 Indeed, political theorists tend to privilege the recognition of Deleuze’s thought over the possibility of an 
encounter, which results in an argument that unintentionally reinforces traditional ways of thinking and acting by 
contrasting them to a different, supposedly ‘Deleuzean’ way to think and act. In other words, Deleuze is taken to 
argue in favour of a radical politics of becoming as opposed to a politics of being; of undecidability as opposed 
to consistency and judgement; of potentiality as opposed to organisation (Virno, 2003; Hardt and Negri, 2000 
and 2006; Claire Colebrook in Alliez et al., 2010 – for further discussion and critique, see: Nail, 2013).  
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Ontologies of Life in Anti-GMO Activism 
The nature of concerns around the issue of agricultural biotechnology has always varied 
widely, reflecting particular geopolitical positions. It ranges from worries about 
environmental integrity and diversity over the reduction and irreversible change of genetic 
resources to issues of social justice and indigenous and/or peasants’ rights (Kinchy, 2012: 2; 
Kousis, 2010: 229). Due to this range of often competing concerns, anti-GMO activists have 
sometimes struggled to keep up a coherent front of action. One example is the so-called 
‘Inter-Continental Caravan’ (ICC), with which several hundred representatives of the Indian 
Karnataka State Farmers Association, together with other Indian farmers and activists from all 
over the world, travelled around Europe in 1999 to protest at the sites of some of the world’s 
most powerful organisations and companies. The period of the late 1990s and early 2000s is 
usually taken to represent the height of anti-GMO activism, particularly in Europe and other 
anti-GMO strongholds such as Brazil and India (Kousis, 2010; Jasanoff, 2011), and the events 
of the ICC entailed a direct encounter between these culturally, socially and geographically 
diverse groups and movements. While “technology sceptic[ism]” lay at the core of concerns 
in Europe, activists in the postcolonial world mainly worried about issues of corporate control 
over seeds and the neoliberal context of technology implementation (Kinchy, 2012: 14; cf. 
Schurman and Munro, 2010: 57; Jasanoff, 2011: 38). As David Featherstone (2003: 415-6) 
points out, European anti-GMO activism was grounded in ideas of purity that led, in typically 
orientalist fashion, to the collapsing of ‘the other’ – postcolonial – identity into nature, by 
implying that ‘good’ farming practices were associated with indigenous ‘primitive’ 
agricultural tradition. Consequently, when directly meeting ‘the other’ at the ICC, many 
European activists appeared to be shocked by the “productivist” tone of some of the Indian 
farmers, who were for example in favour of the use of pesticides on their fields (ibid). This 
provoked considerable tension and disagreement.  
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Kate O’Neill (2004: 239) argues that for most social movement theorists, establishing 
a strong unifying collective identity is deemed crucial for both surviving and succeeding. The 
felt need for a coherent identity as precondition of political success is not only advanced by 
social movement theorists, but also by many activists themselves. Consequently, the different 
norms and identities that emerged within the ICC were seen to weaken its effectiveness and 
success. This reflects, albeit implicitly, a particular ontology of how life is organised more 
generally; an understanding that prioritises entities and their – binary – identities over 
complex, unpredictable, ‘messy’ relations. Deleuze (2004: 167) articulates it as the “dogmatic 
image of thought” in Western societies, which presupposes a particular distribution of subject 
and object: a universal subject exercises all of its faculties in a harmonious manner to identify 
an external object that is always the same. As the next section will point out, this notion also 
dominates traditional genetics and decisively informs the technology of genetic engineering 
(GE), which many activists, particularly those who challenged the technology on a scientific 
basis in the late 1990s and early 2000s, sought to contest.  
Although contemporary expressions of protest regarding agricultural biotechnology 
remain in many ways wedded to earlier anti-GMO arguments (Kinchy, 2012: 14), more 
recently the rhetoric has shifted towards the suggested need to defend individual rights to 
choose which way to farm, as well as towards the socioeconomic consequences of an 
infringement of those rights (ibid: 133; cf. Alessandrini, 2010: 9; Kousis, 2010: 236). The 
debate on rights is closely related to discussions about the possibility of the coexistence of 
GM- and other ‘natural’ or ‘organic’ products, as well as the potential danger of the former 
‘contaminating’ the latter. In the European Communities (EC) the issue of coexistence was 
already debated in the mid-2000s and resulting regulations, such as the compulsory labelling 
of GM-products, have abated much anti-GMO sentiment (Jasanoff, 2011: 144-5). Although 
most anti-GMO activists wish for an outright ban of GMO products, compulsory labelling and 
the conscious protection of non-GMO agriculture are clearly the successful result of ongoing 
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opposition and activism. Moreover, at least in many European countries, labelling GMO 
products equates to an indirect ban anyway. In North America, by contrast, the lack of formal 
coexistence rules, and the fact that the liability of ensuring that agricultural products remain 
GM-free lies on the shoulders of individual farmers, have led to a recent increase in protests 
(Kinchy, 2012: 130-1). Rachel Schurman and William Munro (2010: 180-2) argue that these 
and similar discussions show how simple ‘pro’- or ‘anti’-GMO arguments lose support. 
However, to our mind discussions about ‘coexistence’ and ‘contamination’, which ground the 
success of the movement so far, make even clearer that binary notions of life continue to be at 
the heart of dominant understandings of the world – the dogmatic image of thought –, as 
exemplified by the neat division that is made between GMOs and ‘natural’ products, and 
expressed in the idea of ‘choice’.6  
Hence it is interesting to engage the work of earlier anti-GMO activists who sought to 
challenge this image. These so-called complexity scientists argue that biotechnology is based 
on a reductionist account of life, which fails to grasp life’s complex, relational and ultimately 
uncontrollable character.  
The Potential and Limits of Complexity Science   
For decades, traditional genetics has been dominated by the ‘gene-centric’ school of thought, 
which is strongly related to a Newtonian understanding of the world as existing in perfect 
equilibrium. Gene-centrism is grounded in the so-called ‘Central Dogma’ that maintains that 
developmental information flows in an irreversible linear way from gene to protein to final 
organism. According to Mae-Wan Ho and Susan Oyama, there is a relation between this 
                                                 
6 As one of us has argued elsewhere (Rosenow, 2012), despite recent claims to the contrary (see for example 
Cooper, 2008; Walker and Cooper, 2011; Dillon, 2007) the governance of and resistance to GMOs shows that 
binary conceptions of life have all but disappeared. In fact, the functioning of both the biotech industry and 
governmental agencies heavily rely on a reductionist account of life. 
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understanding of life, which assumes that biological heritage is contained and passed on 
unaltered through the generations, and the underlying Western world view that emphasises 
“the persistence of the eternal soul, or order and stability in the face of change” (Ho, 1998: 72; 
Oyama, 2000: 1), resulting in the ideal of predictability and (self-)control. The stated aim is to 
get to know life as such and thereby one’s own identity; with this knowledge being 
compressed so that it can be possessed and controlled by the subject. Evelyn Fox Keller 
(2000: 6) refers to Walter Gilbert, who describes as ideal the possibility that in future, every 
woman and man is able to pull out a CD of her/his pocket that includes every sequence of 
her/his DNA. This ideal mirrors a reductionist account of life – what we can and should know 
about ourselves, indeed the whole ‘grail’ of knowledge, is supposed to be contained in the 
sequences of our basic units. Although the results of the Human Genome Project that came 
out between 2003 and 2006 have shattered the prospect of finding this grail in our DNA7, the 
ideal of possessing the information to predict and control the development of life has not been 
given up. Despite the acknowledgement that “predictability…as understood by a physicist or 
control engineer, remains an elusive goal”, it “continues to exert a powerful intellectual 
attraction” in the life sciences (Williams and Junhong Luo, 2010: 321). 
What might be a matter of attraction in the life sciences is a matter of necessity for the 
biotech industry and for its governmental regulation. The biotech industry crucially relies on 
the manufacturing, patenting and trading of ‘products’ – in this case the product of ‘the gene’. 
Products need to have discrete properties and clear boundaries; in other words, they need to 
be clearly identifiable and distinct. Indeed, for the logic of biotech patenting to work, what is 
‘natural’ must be clearly differentiable from what is manufactured, and complex organic 
developments need to be reduced to particular informational codes (Pellizzoni, 2011: 797-8).  
                                                 
7 Due to the limited number of genes discovered, the idea that every organic trait can be matched precisely with 
one gene was abandoned.   
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In the late 1990s and early 2000s, this account of life prevalent in the biotech industry 
was challenged by critical scientists such as Ho and Oyama, who refer to themselves as 
‘developmentalists’. These scholars contest the concept of gene agency in the development of 
organisms, maintaining instead that the developmental system “works by perfect 
intercommunication”, diffusing “the distinction between genetic and epigenetic, organism and 
environment” (Ho, 2010: 86). Accordingly, “[t]he cause of development…is the relationship 
of the components, not the components themselves”, which implies that development is 
emergent, and causality rarely linear or straightforward (Gilbert Gottlieb, quoted in Hood et 
al, 2010: 4). Ho turns upside down the traditional hierarchical order of scientist (as subject) 
and scientific object, attempting to give a greater role to the cell or even the organism as a 
whole, which is considered more than the sum of its parts. She argues that the cell or 
organism should be allowed “to tell its own story…to inform us of its internal processes” (Ho, 
1993: 100). Also, drawing on quantum theory, Ho questions the idea that the human observer 
remains “strictly external to the system” and has no impact on the processes s/he observes. In 
the quantum world, observer and observed “seem somehow inextricably entangled” (ibid: 
142). Arguing that “the subjectivist-objectivist dichotomy is falsely drawn”, and that 
subjectivity as such is indeed an “anthropomorphic-anthropocentric concept”  that results 
from human chauvinism (ibid), she concludes: 
Ideally, we ought to be one with the system so that the observer and observed become mutually 
transparent or coherent. For in such a pure, coherent state, the entropy is zero; and hence 
uncertainty and ignorance are both at a minimum…It involves a consciousness that is delocalized 
and entangled with all of nature, when the awareness of the self is heightened precisely because 
self and other are simultaneously accessed. I believe this is the essence of aesthetical or mystical 
experience. (ibid: 168) 
Aesthetic metaphors and images have been extensively used in the critical discourse around 
the notion of the gene and the development of the organism. Oyama (2000: 26), for example, 
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emphasises that the concept of ontogeny resembles a “dance” that is being performed 
throughout the life of an organism. Similarly, Ho (1998: 76) argues that the mechanic “silent 
universe of lifeless, immobile objects” should be replaced with a concept of life as a “vibrant 
world of colour and form, of light and music”. Coen (quoted in Fortun, 2009: 252) confronts 
the common notion of the gene as alphabet or text with a visualisation, according to which 
genes “respond to ‘hidden colors’”. The idea of life as static, linear and mechanical is 
countered with concepts that emphasise its creativity, art, non-reproducable originality, and 
the impossibility of planning due to a lack of choreography (Rosenow, 2012: 543). 
This aesthetic conception of life resonates with Deleuze’s notion of the sensational 
‘encounter’ as a move away from the idea of ‘recognition’ that is characteristic of the 
dogmatic image of thought. Deleuze and Guattari’s co-authored work makes clear that life is 
to be encountered at the level of its complex movements and relations that are, in some sense, 
considered primary over structures of separate entities, their identities, and their organisation. 
Through the creation of concepts such as the rhizome, molecular flows, (de)coding and 
(de)territorialisation Deleuze and Guattari explore the ways in which radically relational 
systems – physical, biological, social, philosophical, linguistic, political, etc. – possess 
emergent forces of self-organisation and (dis)ordering irreducible to the components of the 
system. A plethora of elements, levels, degrees, forces, movements and events encounter in a 
continuous play of forces that is, on account of its mobility and relationality, radically creative 
(Ansell-Pearson, 1999: 156-8; Ansems de Vries, 2014: 92; Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 275-
7). Deleuze and Guattari (2004: 62-63, 327-329, 360) suggest that in this play, forces of 
deterritorialisation and becoming are primary and anterior to forces of reterritorialisation and 
striation, and, at the same time, hold that everything happens at once. This seemingly 
paradoxical position is enabled by their definition of philosophy, in contrast to science, as the 
realm of the creation of concepts that move beyond spatio-temporal coordinates. As such, the 
notion of becoming is presented as a movement that is of a different nature than our ‘normal’ 
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sense of being and matter (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 20-23). Concepts such as becoming 
are multiplicities that have only intensive coordinates, with the implication that their 
components are spatially and temporarily inseparable. By contrast, scientific functions feature 
spatio-temporal variables that are distinct and to be brought in (matching) relation with each 
other (ibid: 23). To paraphrase Hynes (2013: 1931-33), a scientific understanding of life is 
based on the (biopolitical) move of objectification, in which life becomes an object to be 
reflected on and categorised by the observant subject.8 This move necessitates a spatial and 
temporal separation of different components. By contrast, a philosophical understanding – or, 
as Hynes argues, an aesthetic one – enables a more open encounter with life as a force, in 
which subjectivities are generated in a processual manner rather than being presumed as 
“life’s organising principle and master” (ibid: 1934). 
A good example of the constraints that science puts on thought in this particular 
manner is Oyama’s (2000: 6) reference to the “single system” of the organism in which 
interaction does not take place between two autonomous variables, one independent (the 
subject), one dependent (the object), but becomes a systemic feature. For Oyama (ibid: 3), this 
interaction cannot be theorised in the abstract: there is always something “already in place” on 
which information and its operation depends, which leads to the emphasis on history in 
developmentalist biology. However, confined by the scientific framework, Oyama is unable 
to move beyond the spatio-temporal coordinates of organic material “the being of which has 
already been determined” in advance (Hynes, 2013: 1932), and struggles to find the right 
terms for an appropriate understanding of interaction without falling back on the idea of 
variables, or separate entities that can be determined independently of each other.  
                                                 
8 Although, as pointed out in footnote 5, we are critical of certain claims pursued in the biopolitics literature, we 
value its attention to the ways in which science impacts on and supports political and economic decisions in our 
contemporary neoliberal context. See for example Cooper, 2008; Walker and Cooper, 2011. 
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This makes clear why, as exemplified in the previous quote, Ho almost feels 
compelled to abandon the realm of science, or at least to show how science transgresses into 
the area of aesthetical or mystical experience. Hynes (ibid: 1934) points out that this is 
nothing new: biologists often refer to the aesthetic value or implications of their work, and to 
the potential of aesthetics to further advance scientific truth. However, this becomes 
problematic when it serves merely to confirm metaphysical assumptions already held by the 
knowing subject, thereby entrenching existing worldviews, rather than opening up to new 
perspectives through the encounter of life (ibid: 1935). Ho pursues a metaphysics of holism, 
which, according to Hynes (ibid.) resembles “romantic aesthetic values” that emphasise the 
beauty of complexity and diversity, and professes a desire for coherence, purity, harmony and 
perfection. The danger here lies in the invocation of what Deleuze (2004: 64) calls the 
“beautiful soul”, which maintains that differences are “respectable, reconcilable or 
federative”.  
Indeed, criticism of GE is often linked to a perspective in which life progressively 
moves towards a telos of harmony and order. Jeremy Rifkin, for example, appeals in his 
publications and campaigns to notions such as the “integrity of natural kinds” and the “natural 
telos of the self-defining purpose of all life forms” (see Haraway, 1997: 60). This 
understanding once again fixes the development of the forces of life into particular, necessary 
forms; it follows a particular pre-given – harmonious – direction, and thereby misses that 
‘prior’ to their spatio-temporal distillation in forms, structures and entities, these forces can 
become and be encountered in any way – no destination, no structure or form, has been or can 
be determined in advance (cf. Hynes, 2013: 1940-1).9 Due to their radical relationality such 
                                                 
9 Note that a similar tendency can be found in Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s work. Although they claim a 
Deleuzean ontology, they nonetheless present a teleological account informed by harmony, purity and 
coherence. This is especially manifest in their conception of the multitude and their notion of democracy. See: 
Hardt and Negri, 2000; 2006. 
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forces can connect and transform in multiple manners, including harmful ones, as will be 
further explored below.  
‘Natural’ Democracy and ‘Authentic’ Identity? The Dangers of Binary Politics 
For Ho, thinking about life in terms of complexity science has political consequences that go 
beyond her opposition to GE. Challenging the traditional binary between ways of 
understanding nature and ways of understanding society, Ho (1998: 273) maintains that 
organic systems can be compared to radically democratic systems, which, she argues, are 
characterised by inter-communication, mutual responsiveness, and the distribution of control. 
This is contrasted to the assumptions of struggle, competition, and the ‘survival of the fittest’ 
that underlie (neo-)Darwinistic understandings of the world (Ho, 2010: 65-7). Democracy, 
therefore, is for Ho the most natural form of environmental and social organisation. In a 
similar fashion, Stuart Kauffman (1995: 5, 28) draws upon insights from the complexity 
sciences to argue that “the idea of a pluralistic democratic society” is not to be thought of as 
simply a human creation; it is “part of the natural order of things”. In his account of life, 
Kauffman (ibid.) identifies “hints of an apologia for a pluralistic society as the natural design 
for adaptive compromise”. 
The importance of this perspective on democracy lies in the ontological connection of 
political and life processes – politics and life are understood to operate in the same manner, at 
least in their true, ‘natural’ form. The problem is, however, that this seemingly non-binary 
ontology of the relationship of politics and life remains grounded in an onto-theology that 
tends back to binarism. Ho’s and Kauffman’s attempts to draw parallels between the 
organisation of society and the organisation of nature is indirectly based on their very 
distinction – one has to ‘learn’ from the other; the ‘natural’ is primary, because it is the 
producer of ‘true’ living. In addition, it is reflective of the idea that the way nature is 
16 
 
perceived and grasped in science – complexity science – is unrepresented; that nature simply 
presents itself. This misses the functioning of science as an ordering system, as Deleuze and 
Guattari point out in their differentiation between science and philosophy.  
Deleuze and Guattari (2004: 235) employ the concept of “fascism” to draw attention 
to the dangers intrinsic to such binary thinking. The term “molar fascism” relates to 
movements of reterritorialisation, referring to the rigidification of segmentised categories, 
which reduces life’s complexity to dualistic choices. It is in distinction to reterritorialising 
forces, and the molar fascistic tendencies intrinsic to it, that Deleuze and Guattari develop the 
notion of becoming to refer to life’s fundamental relationality and connectivity, which 
involves the disruption and blurring of boundaries between binary categories such as living 
and non-living, organic and non-organic, and material and immaterial.10  The value of the 
notion of becoming in the current context is its move away from conceptualising life’s 
evolution in terms of filiative production. Rather, Deleuze and Guattari speak of ‘involution’ 
which operates through ‘contagion’ and ‘epidemics’ and  
involves terms that are entirely heterogeneous: for example, a human being, an animal, and a 
bacterium, a virus, a molecule, a microorganism…These combinations are neither genetic nor 
structural; they are interkingdoms, unnatural participations. (ibid: 267) 
The account of life presented by Ho and Kauffman remains foreclosed to this aspect of 
complexity. They advocate plurality only in a very specific sense, as related to what they 
consider to be ‘natural’. Due to their endeavour to eliminate struggle from ‘natural’ – and, by 
implication, societal – order, any element of struggle, or the monstrosity of ‘interkingdoms’ 
                                                 
10 It is to be noted that movements of becoming contain their own fascistic tendencies, described as ‘suicidal’ by 
Deleuze and Guattari.The significance of Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualisation of fascism lies therefore not 
merely in the identification of molar fascism with the reterritorialisation of thought. More importantly, they 
contend that movements of both de- and re-territorialisation hold an intrinsic danger to turn fascistic – each form 
of movement has a form of fascism specific to it. Movements of relative deterritorialisation are haunted by 
micro-fascism whilst lines of flight contain a tendency to turn suicidal. See: Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 250-3; 
Ansems de Vries, 2013: 132). 
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and ‘unnatural participations’ is confined to the realm of the ‘unnatural’ that becomes nature’s 
binary ‘other’. The truth of nature as a harmonious, democratic system is opposed to less 
democratic forms of organisation. This new segmentation is more rigid than the traditional 
distinction between nature and society in the sense that its claims about the latter are grounded 
in a given ‘truth’ about life that cannot be challenged. As Deleuze and Guattari (2004: 250) 
put it, molar fascism is dangerous because it makes us fearful creatures who cling to the 
security of binary choices – who “flee from flight” and “reterritorialize on anything 
available”. 
This tendency can be detected in the anti-GMO movement more generally, which 
makes clear that simply resisting a particular order is not sufficient and may be counter-
productive in its effects. The struggle between plurality and unity in the ICC anti-GMO 
protest referred to earlier illustrates this, as its disruption of the dominant order is swiftly 
compensated through movements of reterritorialisation. The dangers specific to this situation, 
according to Deleuze and Guattari, are the reproduction of rigidified segmentary categories in 
miniature form. Out of their conviction for the need for a united movement against GE, some 
people within the ICC demand clear-cut identification, and critique those identities considered 
inauthentic. From the point of view of many of the Indian ICC participants, the constitution of 
a global ‘we’ presupposes a particular essential Indian ‘we’, with a particular (national) 
identity and culture. Particularly strong is the – postcolonial – differentiation from the 
Western world, grounded in a demand for (re-)gaining control over one’s own livelihood, 
which is allegedly compromised by the neo-imperialist interference of multinational 
corporations, international organisations, and Western elites (Nanjundaswamy, 1999).11 The 
ideal of autonomy goes hand in hand with the ideal of authenticity, which Indian ICC 
                                                 
11 As pointed out in the second section, arguments regarding autonomy and the making of sovereign decisions 
about one’s own life and mode of production have become even stronger in contemporary anti-GMO activism. 
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participants do not only claim for themselves, but which is also attributed to them as cultural 
‘other’ and ‘true’ voice of grievance by their European allies. 
The danger of fascism intrinsic to demands for authenticity is well-illustrated by the 
Indian ICC participant who glorified Hitler when travelling through Germany. Hitler was 
praised as someone who “defended the German nation state when it was in crisis, by getting 
rid of the problem elements”, and India would have to do the same (Anon, 1999: 29). 
Excursions into nationalism could be regarded as the inevitable dark side of producing clear-
cut enemies that are opposed to a particular romanticised traditional and indigenous lifestyle. 
However, this relation between grounding the constitution of the collective subject in a 
particular ‘authentic’ identity, and the exclusion of those elements ‘foreign’ to this identity, is 
not recognised by an anonymous European ICC critic, who uses the example of the Hitler-
celebrating Indian for a critique of the ICC as such. S/he demands the exclusion of the 
exclusion, which means that s/he wants to see the ‘Nazi’ as enemy and not as ally, with both 
being clearly distinct. S/he asks how it could be that this participant was provided with free 
food and accommodation (Anon, 1999: 29), without answering the question what should have 
been done instead – kick him out in the middle of the German countryside with no food and 
accommodation?  
Thus, one of the dangers of this form of fascism is that it leads to a demarcation 
between forms of life to be fostered (those that are natural, harmonious and authentic) and 
forms of life to be excluded or destroyed. The production of the other as less than authentic or 
natural may turn into a dismissal of the other as dangerous and/or inhuman. This, according to 
Deleuze and Claire Parnet (2006: 103), turns us into “creatures which are most fearful, but 
also most pitiless and bitter”. The presence of fascist tendencies in both instances of resistance 
against a dominant system – in Ho’s and Kauffman’s invocation of democracy as well as in 
the ICC anti-GMO protests – illustrates that the dangers of exclusion, violence and 
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destruction are intrinsic both to forms of rule and to forms of resistance challenging these 
systems and practices of rule. They are enshrined in categories of thought that are taken as 
commonsense; they are delimited by the ‘dogmatic image of thought’. 
Moreover, Ho’s attempt to eradicate struggle and monstrosity is not only problematic 
in relation to its dangerous effects, it is also somewhat surprising given her adherence to an 
ontology of complexity. If, due to its radical relationality, life has the capacity to transform in 
ways that are unpredictable and changing, this may involve manifestations that are disruptive, 
dangerous and/or violent – as Deleuze’s concept of the encounter makes clear. Yet, Ho does 
not allow for life to develop into something monstrous. For Deleuze and Guattari, in 
distinction, the radical relationality of politics-life implies that human and non-human forces 
are continuous; and that ‘nature’ is far from ‘naturally’ democratic. Nature and life are 
becoming, and becoming involves processes of relationality among heterogeneous forces and 
elements. What defines life for Deleuze and Guattari is its potentiality and immanent 
tendency to become other than itself, to break the limits of its own constitutive being through 
transversal connectivities, that is, through a play of encounters rather than processes of 
recognition. This involves all manner of monstrous, disruptive and/or violent connections and 
transformations. The connectivity of disease is a good example: viruses, as Eugene Thacker 
(2009) points out, connect, transform and disrupt across all manner of bounds and limits. 
Viruses do not respect human boundaries, species boundaries, national boundaries and social 
boundaries. Epidemics involve “a whole network of vital forces”, both human and non-
human, at the micro- as well as at the macro-level, e.g. “global travel, inter-species contagion, 
protein-protein interactions” (ibid: 135, 143). It is in the context of life’s unbounded and 
unpredictable potential for becoming that Deleuze and Guattari (2004: 267) argue that this is 
“the only way Nature operates – against itself”. 
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Encountering GMOs: New Perspectives on Radical Political Action 
It is important to emphasise that our critique of anti-GMO activism is not to be confused with 
a dismissal of oppositional activism per se. Such a dismissal would simply produce a new 
binary: between a ‘correct’ Deleuzean ontology and the ‘errant’ assumptions and actions of 
oppositional political movements. Indeed, our analysis is subject to this fascistic danger of 
simply offering a different, yet no less dangerous, means of identification and categorisation. 
As John Protevi (2009: 90) puts it, “slotting things into categories (placing differences within 
a horizon of identity)” implies “that we are [still] not yet thinking” in the way Deleuze urges 
us to do; that we have still not moved beyond the dogmatic image of thought; that we still 
attempt to ‘recognise’ and not ‘encounter’. Indeed, pursuing the idea of becoming exposes us 
to things that cannot be grasped by existing recognisable categories. It requires a double 
move: on the one hand, we must be open to ‘sensation’ that forces (new) thought into being 
(Wasser, 2012: 124). This creation of (new) concepts deterritorialises the movement of 
reterritorialisation that every new concept performs as soon as it is captured in thought and 
action (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 5-8). On the other hand, we must understand that it is 
impossible – and perhaps undesirable – to escape reterritorialisation altogether.  
What could all of this mean in concrete political terms? How can it inform radical 
political action? In order to move away from recognition and avoid instant reterritorialisation, 
we feel compelled to turn to individual narratives of particular experiences; narratives that 
induce their reader to grasp the potency of the encounters described at a more sensual rather 
than simply intellectual (i.e. categorising) level. An example related to the struggle against 
GMOs is offered by the anthropologist Kregg Hetherington, who researched peasant activism 
in relation to the expansion of (genetically modified) soybean monoculture in Paraguay in 
recent years. Hetherington recounts his encounter with soy ‘killer beans’ – beans assumed to 
literally kill people and animals – via Antonio, a leader of a local peasant movement. 
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Sceptical about the truth-claims made by Antonio and others regarding the lethal potential of 
the beans, Hetherington (2013: 67) explains how he initially attempted to “translate” what 
was presented to him as scientific “fact” into “social phenomena”, which implied that he took 
the – ‘false’ – notion of the killer bean to be a signifier for the broader decline of campesino 
life: 
Until this point, I had approached ethnography as an extended discussion with and about humans, 
and I was less interested in beans than I was with what Antonio said about them…To be blunt, 
Antonio kept pointing at the beans, and I kept looking at him…I was comfortable saying that this 
was a figure of speech, a kind of political rhetoric, or even to claim that this is what Antonio 
believed, all of which explicitly framed ‘la soja mata’ (soy kills) as data for social analysis, rather 
than analysis itself worthy of response. (ibid: 67; emphasis in original) 
Antonio’s remarks were an ‘object’ for Hetherington, recognisable within existing categories 
(cf. Wasser, 2012: 124). However, he (Hetherington, 2013: 67) points out that not believing in 
the truth of the killer bean did not prevent him from “participating in Antonio’s knowledge 
practices”. Hetherington became “part of the situation” that finally pushed killer beans from 
being an errant knowledge practice to a matter of national concern, when two soy farmers 
were brought to court for the murder of two anti-GMO activist peasants. Crucially, 
participation involved more than joining the situation in spite of his lack of belief: through the 
continuous encounter with ‘the bean’ Hetherington (ibid: 72) became part of a human-
nonhuman play of forces in which the beans themselves exercised a physical 
“excessive…force”: 
Beans didn’t scare me at first. Indeed, as a foreigner to the situation that gives rise to killer beans 
(a Canadian no less), giant fields of soy were a familiar, even a comforting sight. But it took only a 
few months with Antonio for me to start feeling the menace from those fields. Soon, the sweetish 
smell of glyphosate, recently applied, and especially the corpselike smell of 2, 4-D mixed with 
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Tordon, could ruin my appetite and make me expect to see people emerge from their homes to 
show me pustules on their legs and stomachs. (ibid) 
This example illustrates how encounters move thought and action beyond the exercise of 
“fact-checking” (ibid: 66) and movements of identification and categorisation towards a play 
of transversal connectivities. Encountering the beans in this particular context produced “a 
difference in sensation” (Wasser, 2012: 124), straining the categories that delimited 
Hetherington’s thought, annihilating the desire to “overcome error” through immediate 
affection (Ruddick, 2010: 36). Encountering the killer bean enabled Hetherington (in an 
arguably re-ordering manner!) to reflect on the history and context of his “error-tackling” 
approach. For instance, how it relates to a (post-)colonial perspective on modernisation that 
set out to eliminate knowledge from indigenous superstition; how it is situated within our 
contemporary capitalist context, as well as within particular legal regimes and commensense 
agricultural practices. Indeed, this context and history put Hetherington in a particular 
position that enabled him to participate and be affected in the first place: it impacted on his 
bodily and affective resonances – smell, light, fear, conviction, disease, death – and created 
‘unforeseen’ and ‘surpris[ing]’ alliances (Ruddick, 2010: 23; cf. Hetherington, 2013: 72-75). 
The encounter stops the ‘killer bean’ from being merely a question of ‘truth’, and the question 
of whether or not to join the anti-GMO movement is no longer one that is pre-emptively 
mulled over and judged from a distant point of critique. Instead of asking whether beans 
‘truly’ kill or not, the decisive question is what Donna Haraway calls ‘response-ability’ – 
whether it enabled a response (Hetherington, 2013: 69).12  
                                                 
12 This is similar to Sarah Whatmore’s (2002) conceptualisation, which equally challenges the conception of the soybean as a 
‘thing’, the character of which has been modified, or a ‘natural product’, the essential nature of which has been disturbed 
through genetic modification. Whatmore’s (ibid: 139, 142) argument for “the lively potency of things” disrupts the 
boundaries between humans and things and moves the focus from the (GM) soybean as such to the wider play of forces, what 
she calls “the soybean’s assemblage as a socio-material hybrid.” Of interest is not the soybean itself, but the assemblages of 
heterogeneous connectivities through which certain conceptions of the soybean come into being.  
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We can see a politics of encounter and ‘response-ability’ at work also in 
Hetherington’s recounting of the story of a cotton-farmer who declared that the only way to 
save his crop from pests and drought was continuous awareness of the needs of his plants. 
Late at night, he could often “hear his cotton crying”, which made him unable to sleep and 
rush out to the fields early in the morning with pesticides (Hetherington, 2013: 70). 
Hetherington points out that it would have been “a completely misplaced question to ask 
whether cotton is really crying”. The cotton-farmer has no theory of crying cotton, and no 
need for one; all he knows is that “he has to respond” (ibid: 70; emphasis in original). 
Similarly, it could be argued that it matters little whether GMOs are really as directly harmful 
as many anti-GMO activists continue to claim, or whether life is really a precisely 
coordinated ‘dance’, as developmentalist biologists such as Oyama maintain  – what matters 
is the kind of “pragmatic intervention” that the encounter enables (ibid: 70). Indeed, it might 
have been the encounter rather than the scientific understanding that led Oyama to 
conceptualise life as a ‘dance’ in the first place. The ‘things’ encountered impact on us in our 
intervention or, rather, we come into being and/as we become other through encounters – 
grounded and ungrounded. If we are not open to this move, we will continue to reproduce 
binary oppositions, such as the one between ‘political intervention’ and ‘(scientific) facts’.  
One aspect that does not feature in Hetherington’s account is the fundamental 
indeterminacy of the encounter, what Hynes (2013: 1941) refers to as “indeterminacy of the 
not-yet”. The ‘outcome’ cannot be given in advance, and it is equally impossible to 
distinguish ‘good’ from ‘bad’ political action from a distant point of critique and judgement. 
The potentiality of lines of flight only opens up in concrete encounters, and their shape 
depends on particular contexts and plays of forces, as Hetherington’s narrative exemplifies. 
Moreover, this play involves both grounding and ungrounding forces, which are often 
difficult to tell apart: radical politics is not possible without a certain form of organisation. In 
fact, given the continuity of the play of de- and reterritorialisation, one cannot speak of an 
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outcome without reterritorialising on a certain order of things. This is evident, for instance, in 
the construction of ‘killer beans’ as entitites by Antonio and others, which involves a 
movement of reterritorialisation, as does the construction of ‘GMOs’, ‘Nature’ (with a capital 
N), and authentic ‘peasants’. If the danger of fascism lurks in every move of 
deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, this should not keep us from pursuing encounters 
for it is in the play of forces that the potential of a political move that is not pre-determined in 
binary choices emerges. Thus, in Hetherington’s experience, it is through the connectivity of a 
range of heterogeneous forces and things that the killer bean emerges as something more and 
different than a literal ‘killer’, and that different responses become possible. Conceptualising 
it as encounter instead of a truth-telling exercise, attentive to the infinite multiplicity of ways 
in which life can and does become, might thus soften potentially (molar) fascist edges and 
keep us from turning what Deleuze and Parnet (2006: 103) call “pitiless and bitter”.  
For instance, in the case of the ICC, such an approach towards direct political action 
would enable participants to move beyond categories of clear-cut opposition and identity as 
the basis for judging one another as well as the world as such. As Todd May (2007: 32-3) 
emphasises, there is a need to build an “affective relationship” towards one another that is 
asymmetric – you give out without knowing what will come back – and therefore contest the 
“symmetry of exchange” dominant in modern societies.13 Pushed further, emphasising the 
need for asymmetry pays tribute to Deleuze’s claim that nature operates against itself. Nature 
is neither teleological nor harmonious and continuously disrupts the bounds of its constitutive 
entities. Such an understanding unsettles the arguments that have been advanced by both anti-
GMO activists and a variety of governmental agencies in more recent times, which have led 
to the creation of an encompassing category that transforms GMOs into particular products to 
be classified, labelled and – symmetrically – traded (Lezaun, 2006: 500). 
                                                 
13 May uses the political theory of Rancière to make this argument, but we maintain that these elements also fit 
well with our analysis here. 
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Conclusion 
The article has suggested that neither straightforward opposition, nor, reversely, opposing the 
opposition (cf. Massumi, 1996: 404) is sufficient for encouraging a radical politics. Through 
an engagement with Deleuze and Guattari’s thought, we have developed a perspective that 
challenges the ultimately binary perspectives of anti-GMO activists and complexity scientists 
whilst acknowledging the importance of binary thinking and action in the success of radical 
political resistance. The ‘issue’ of GMOs has exemplified this paradox or play of binarity and 
complexity in politics-life.  
The value of complexity science lies in undermining the notion of certainty and 
contesting the primacy accorded to scientific objectivity by blurring the distinctions between 
scientific object and subject. However, the continued reliance on a scientific framework that 
renders possible ‘true’ knowledge about nature – considered as naturally harmonious – 
produces a hierarchical relationship whereby Nature gains a privileged position and becomes 
a role model for society. We thus return to binary conceptions of life and politics, which have 
become hierarchical; that is, a judgement on what is ‘natural’ and harmonious and what is 
‘unnatural’ and dangerous. As pointed out through the example of the ICC, a similar 
understanding has characterised the anti-GMO movements at large, including contemporary 
discussions about coexistence and ‘contamination’. It is expressive of taken-for-granted 
categories of thought, which demand authentic identity, political coherence, and non-
contradiction.  
Our proposition for a politics of encounter that opens to the play of grounding and 
ungrounding forces brings to light both the potential and the limitations of oppositional 
manifestations of political resistance. Divisions give activists a sense of collectivity and 
political strength, but they also create new – and more forceful – boundaries, binaries and 
hierarchies; excluding the ‘other’ in the name of natural harmony and all-inclusive consensus. 
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The latter is particularly the case when fleeting and deterritorialised life is understood to 
completely replace and oppose reterritorialised and organised life. Pursuing encounters in the 
sense that Deleuze encourages us to do means an occasional dispensation of judgement, and 
the nurturing of asymmetrical affective relationships. It leads to openness towards the ‘shock’ 
of sensational encounter, “to what bites and scratches, to what it will drag, kicking and 
screaming, into thought” (Wasser, 2012: 124). Encounters takes place within a specific 
context that is shaped by particular (historical) ‘power geometries’, bringing to the fore the 
violence of the taken-for-granted categories that this context has sedimented. It enables us to 
politically pursue lines of flight without knowing for sure where they take us, as the narrative 
of anti-soy bean activism in Paraguay has exemplified. But it also implies the understanding 
that fleeting life will settle on an organisational form that (necessarily) excludes. Fear of such 
exclusion should not lead to political paralysis.  
As Audrey Wasser (2012: 124) emphasises, the encounter is ‘thought’s genetic middle 
point’ – never the beginning nor the end. It confronts the limits of existing thought (and 
action), serves to generate new thought (and action), and then again exposes the limits of the 
latter. Embracing lines of flight, deterritorialisations, and reterritorialisations as (literal) moves 
enables us to see that there is scope for intervention, based on different imaginaries of thought 
and action created, dissembled, and re-assembled in encounters. To encounter the play of 
becoming and striation – of disruptive and constitutive forces – widens our understanding of 
life and politics, and the potentialities of transforming what there is. 
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